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IMPLICATIONS OF INTRA-FAMILY AND EXTERNAL OWNERSHIP TRANSFER OF 
FAMILY FIRMS: SHORT-TERM AND LONG TERM PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES  
 
ABSTRACT 
We  contrast  the  performance  consequences  of  intra-family  vs.  external  ownership  transfers. 
Investigating  a  sample  of  all  private  family  firms  in  Sweden  that  went  through  ownership 
transfers during ten years, we find family firms transferred to external owners outperforming 
those transferred within the family, but that survival is higher among intra-family transfers. We 
attribute these performance differences to the long-term orientation of family firms passed on to 
the next generation and to the entrepreneurial willingness of acquirers to bear uncertainty. Based 
on  distinct  ownership  transition  routes  and  theoretical  mechanisms  explaining  performance 
differences, we outline implications for family business and entrepreneurship research.   
 
JEL CODES: L26, M13 









Succession is the single most studied topic in family business research (Sharma, 2004; LeBreton-
Miller, Miller and Steier, 2004). An important insight from this literature is that the type of 
succession route that a family chooses will likely impact the future performance of the business 
(DeMassis, Chua and Chrisman, 2008). In the case of passing on a family business within the 
same  family,  this  act  can  be  seen  as  a  family‘s  continued  commitment  to  entrepreneurship, 
representing both an exit of current owner-managers and the entry of the next generation. As an 
alternative to passing on the business to the next generation of family members, owner-managers 
can decide to exit the business and transfer ownership to outside parties if they deem this the 
more attractive option. This dilemma is one of the most central and difficult decisions for a 
business family, having vast implications for the business. The transfer of ownership to outsiders 
can  represent  an  entrepreneurial  exit  and  the  harvesting  of  the  efforts  of  generations  of 
predecessors  (DeTienne,  2010),  leaving  the  business  in  the  hands  of  those  that  are  better 
equipped to continue value creation. Divestment of established companies typically provides the 
sellers with resources they can invest in new business opportunities (Mason and Harrison, 2006).  
Thus, the organizational implications of succession and ownership transfer should be regarded as 
important  for  strategic  entrepreneurship;  a  concept  that  refers  to  how  owners  and  managers 
combine a firm‘s opportunity and advantage seeking behaviors to create new value (Hitt et al., 
2011; Webb, Ketchen and Ireland, 2010). 
While the organizational consequences of appointing inside or outside management is a 
recurring theme in the strategic management, entrepreneurship and family business literatures 
(De Massis et al., 2008; Karaevli, 2007), the performance differences between intra-family and 





2010). Different types of succession are likely to have different impacts on the performance of 
the business post-succession (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). For example, it has been noted that 
the performance implications of ownership transfers from the first to the second generation are 
different from ownership transfers from second to third generation (Molly, Laveren and Deloof, 
2010).  
Given that passing the ownership of a family business to owners outside the family most 
often has such substantial implications for the family and the business, it is surprising to note the 
paucity  of  research  comparing  the  performance  consequences  of  intra-family  vs.  external 
ownership transfer. The assumption is commonplace in much of the extant succession literature 
that if an heir is available, intra-family transfer of ownership will be preferred (De Massis et al., 
2008).  
We define intra-family transfer of ownership as occurring when one or several members 
in the nuclear or immediate family leave the ownership of the family firm in the hands of a 
successor (spouse or children). External transfer of ownership occurs when non-family members 
take over the ownership. While recent empirical research has found that firms taken over by 
outsiders generally perform better than those that remain within the family (Bennedsen et al., 
2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), an emerging strand in the family business literature reports 
that family firms tend to have different time horizons and attitudes to risk compared to non-
family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; James, 1999; Zellweger, 2007). As a consequence, it is 
likely that the performance implications of intra-family vs. external ownership transfers may be 
different.  The few  available studies  to  date have only examined the immediate performance 
changes following succession, despite the fact that the performance implications of overhauls in 





(Bharadwaj,  2000;  Capron,  1999;  Webb  et  al.,  2010).  Further,  inasmuch  as  the  short-term 
financial implications of ownership changes tend to be small, they may well not clearly reveal 
the full extent to which changes in ownership in family firms brings about systematic variations 
in  performance  (Moeller,  Schlingemann  and  Stultz,  2005).  Thus,  to  extend  knowledge  on 
succession  and  entrepreneurship  in  family  firms,  we  argue  that  research  concerned  with  the 
performance effects of different types of ownership transitions needs to look more closely at the 
differences in the short-term and long-term effects on performance. To address these problems 
we utilize a research design which exploits unique longitudinal database allowing us to compare 
the  short-  and  long-term  performance  implications  of  intra-family  vs.  external  ownership 
transitions in a country‘s entire population of privately held family firms.  
We seek to make three principal contributions to the literature. First, while management 
succession and their implications for a business have received scholarly attention for many years 
(DeMassis et al., 2008; Molly et al., 2010), ownership transfers have not. This is unfortunate 
because the takeover of ownership marks a radical change in the fate of the family business and 
one that can have substantial performance implications. New outside owners tend to infuse the 
firms that they acquire with new energy and resourcese, which can be instrumental for exploiting 
new business opportunities (Nordqvist and Melin, 2010; Parker and Van Praag, 2011). Focusing 
on the performance implications of external ownership transfers seems particularly important 
given that such transfers appear to be more common than intra-family transfers of ownership. 
Although precise measures of this pattern are uncertain and vary across studies and empirical 
contexts, it seems that only 20 to 30% of all family businesses are transferred internally to the 
next generation (e.g., Sardeshmukh and Corbett, 2011). The sheer magnitude of the phenomenon 





Second,  it  appears  that  many  family  firms  have  a  long-term  orientation  (Miller  and 
LeBreton-Miller, 2005; Lumpkin and Brigham, forthcoming) and are more risk averse than other 
firms (Zellweger, 2007). While such differences may well have performance implications, it is 
likely that the short- and long-term performance implications will be different. By developing 
hypotheses and empirically examining such short-term and long-term implications, we aim to 
articulate important insights about the long-term orientation of family businesses. As noted by 
Lumpkin, Brigham and Moss (2010), the long-term orientation of family business is likely to 
play an important role for the extent to which these firms exhibit an entrepreneurial orientation. 
Third,  the  empirical  literature  on  the  performance  effects  of  succession  to  date  has  focused 
primarily on CEO succession in  publicly listed and often large family firms  (Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001; Pérez-González, 2006). Less attention has been paid to the 
performance effects of intra-family vs. external transfers of ownership in small private firms, 
despite the vast majority of family firms in most economies being private and small in size. In 
these privately held family firms, ownership and management are often unified, and the transfer 
of management and ownership typically go hand in hand (Carney, 2005). While one important 
study (Bennedsen et al., 2007) examined the three-year mean operating profitability of privately 
held  family  firms  following  intra-family  or  external  ownership  transfers,  it  only  attended  to 
short-term  effects.  The  few studies focusing on performance effects  following succession in 
privately held family firms are relatively narrow, having attended to perceived profitability just 
shortly after succession (Venter, Boshoff and Maas, 2005) or are valuable yet just single case 
studies  (Dyck  et  al.,  2002).  Thus,  our  research  about  the  performance  implications  of  the 
simultaneous  transfer  of  ownership  and  management  adds  substantial  generality  to  our 





The remaining parts of the paper are structured as follows. In the next section we outline 
the theory and formulate our hypotheses. In the first part we argue that transfer of ownership 
within the family will lead to positive short-term firm performance. In the second part we argue 
that  long-term  performance  will  be  more  positive  for  firms  transferred  to  outside  owners, 
compared to those passed on within the family. Following our theory section we present our 
methods and substantive results.  In the final section we elaborate our results and the contribution 
our research makes to the extant literature on strategy and entrepreneurship in family businesses. 
The paper concludes by acknowledging some limitations of our study and with suggestions for 
future research.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Long-Term  Orientation  and  Implications  for  Short-Term  Performance  of  Intra-Family 
and External Ownership Transitions 
In order to understand the performance implications of intra-family vs. external ownership 
transitions in family firms, we first examine the incentives that families have for making these 
ownership transitions and the incentives for outsiders to acquire family firms. Provided that there 
is an heir within the family, both types of ownership transfer are realistic.  
Family  firms  are  often  credited  for  having  a  long-term  orientation  defined  as  ―the 
tendency to prioritize the long range implications and impact of decisions and actions that come 
to  fruition  after  an  extended  time  period  (Lumpkin  et  al.,  2010:  245).  Such  a  long-term 
orientation is associated with a preference for foregoing short-term financial rewards in favor of 
long-term returns (James, 1999; Zellweger, 2007), and a willingness to forego an optimal capital 





probability of retaining the control rights over the firm in the long run (Mishra and McConaughy, 
1999).  However, this vision of the standard potential long-term orientation of family businesses 
is predicated on the assumption that families intend to retain control rights within the family for 
extended periods of time, often over several generations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  
We suggest that while long-term orientation may generally be predominant among family 
firms, there is a significant variance in the extent to which family firms exhibit such a long-term 
orientation. Some but not all family businesses are managed  for the long run with the clear 
intention to be transferred to the next generation, while other families manage their businesses 
with the intention of cashing in on their hard work. Letting go of the ownership of a family 
business by selling it to an external party may on occasion be a better way of preserving family 
financial wealth (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005) and socio-emotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). We expect the degree to which family businesses have a long-term orientation to impact 
short- and long-term performance of businesses that are sold externally and those that are passed 
on to the next generation. First, we expect financial performance in firms transferred within the 
family to be lower, but survival higher, than for those transferred to  outside owners for the 
following  reason:  A  family  that  transfers  the  ownership  of  the  business  internally  lacks  the 
incentive to maximize short-term performance, but will tend to focus on maximizing long-term 
endurance of the business (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002).  A family that manages a firm that is 
about to be sold to an external party is likely to strive to maximize short-term performance for 
two reasons. First, it facilitates the family maximizing the income it is able to reap before the 
business is sold. Second, higher performance has a signaling value, of making a business appear 





The potential ‗baiting‘ value of such signaling should be particularly high in privately 
held small family businesses. The majority of most family businesses and the ones examined 
here are prone to information asymmetry between insiders and potential external buyers.  While 
large publicly listed companies divulge substantial detailed information, in small private family 
firms there is less need for written contracts, reports, and other formal documents that can be 
examined by outsiders (Carney, 2005). Thus, families have access to extensive information about 
all aspects of their business, but this information is not manifestly visible or easily accessible to 
outsiders.  
This  information  asymmetry  can  be  used  opportunistically,  leading  to  the  adverse 
selection problem (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). To the extent that families are able to capitalize on 
this information asymmetry, incentives are created for them to turn to the outside market to sell 
some  but  not  other  firms.  In  other  words,  families  owning  privately  held  companies  can 
capitalize  on  information  asymmetry  by  ‗window  dressing‘  the  firms  presented  as  potential 
acquisition targets to outsiders. Moreover, because families likely do this ‗window dressing‘ of 
firms  that  are  external  acquisition  targets  (Buono  and  Bowditch,  1989)  but  not  for  those 
transferred internally, these firms are likely to exhibit artificially high performance prior to the 
sale, but a performance that probably will fall off after acquisition.  In contrast, a similar drop in 
performance is less likely for firms transferred within the family.  
In sum, firms transferred intra-family are likely to exhibit a long-term orientation with 
similar performance levels directly before and directly after the ownership transfer. In contrast, 
firms transferred externally are likely to exhibit high performance directly prior to the transfer 





‗window dressing‘), but this performance tends to diminish directly after the ownership transfer. 
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The short-term performance following ownership transfer will be more 
positive for intra-family transfers than for external transfers 
 
We have suggested that firms  where ownership is  passed to  the next  generation of family 
members exhibit systematic differences from those firms sold off to external parties, namely the 
degree to which they have a long-term orientation. The previous hypothesis suggested that these 
differences  have  some  immediate,  short-term  performance  implications.  However,  the 
implications of the two types of ownership transfers might also pose differing consequences for 
firms‘ long-term performance. In essence, we contend that long-term performance in companies  
transferred outside the family is likely to be better than in those passed on to other family 
members. This argument is not uncontroversial, but has been rarely tested empirically (Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2006). We propose that because family businesses retained within the family across 
generations have a long-term orientation (Lumpkin et al., 2010; Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 
2005),  they  tend  to  avoid  debt  financing  in  order  to  retain  control  rights  over  their  firms 
(Zellweger, 2007). Such reluctance to rely on outside financing is consequential, making them 
prone  to  forego  investment  opportunities  that  require  fast  decision  making  and  immediate 
financial commitment (Lumpkin and Brigham, 2011).  
An additional reason why ownership transition to outsiders leads to better financial 
performance  relates  to  the  consideration  family  owners  tend  to  give  to  non-financial 
performance outcomes (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist and Brush, forthcoming). As they mature, 





goals such as status, family employment and autonomy rather than vehicles for financial wealth 
creation. Owner families are known for their concern for ―non-financial aspects of the firm that 
meet the family‘s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence and 
the perpetuation of the family dynasty‖ (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007: 106). These concerns mean 
that family owners are ready to  absorb higher risk to protect their legacy and keep family 
control  of  the  firm  over  the  long  run,  even  at  the  expense  of  poor  financial  performance 
(Gomez-Mejia, Makri and Larraza Kintana, 2010). The pursuit of non-financial performance 
outcomes and the emotional attachment to their business is a unique feature of family owners 
(Zellweger et al.,2011), and is likely to spread throughout the family. ―Family owners may 
restrict share dealing to kinship members who are similarly concerned with family agendas 
rather than having a sole focus on financial performance‖ (Westhead and Howorth, 2006: 303). 
Conversely, we assume outside owners who lack an emotional attachment to the firm to be 
more likely to develop a strategic agenda that puts more focus upon traditional performance 
outcomes.  
Moreover, companies transferred within the family will over time suffer from the fact that 
owners and managers tend to be drawn from a smaller competence pool, compared to firms 
transferred  to  outsiders.  This  restriction  is  likely  to  have  an  unfavorable  effect  on  a  firm‘s 
capabilities, i.e., its capacity to generate value (Grant, 1996). Such negative effects have been 
documented in both publicly listed (Pérez-González, 2006; Hillier and McColgan, 2009) and 
private small- and medium-sized (Bennedsen et al., 2007) family businesses. A recent review 
reports several studies that found the average ability of nonfamily heirs to be higher than the 
average ability of family heir managers, because the former come from a far larger talent pool 





provision  of  new  and  valuable  perspectives  and  ideas  whose  input  can  positively  impact 
performance.  
Although  it  is  possible  for  a  family  firm  to  retain  ownership  while  transferring 
management responsibilities to outsiders, most small- and medium-sized family firms, including 
those investigated here,, are characterized by unified ownership and management (Carney, 2005; 
Westhead and Howorth, 2006). New owners from outside the family are more likely to appoint 
non-family  managers  who  will  introduce  strategies  and  organizational  change  aimed  at 
improving  performance,  and  these  will  typically  take  time  to  measurably  pay-off.  Thus, 
companies  transferred  within  the  family  might  suffer  from  negative  long-term  performance 
consequences  compared  to  companies  transferred  to  outsiders  (Pérez-González,  2006; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007), since the outside-owned companies are less likely to put a kin-based 
restriction on management (Chua, et al., 2009).  
The  involvement  of  the  family  system  in  private  firms  also  increases  ownership 
complexity (Westhead and Howorth, 2006), one consequence being that companiestransferred 
within the family run a greater risk of suffering from relationship conflicts (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston,  2004;  Schulze  et  al.,  2001).  The  negative  effect  of  family  conflicts  on  firm 
performance is well documented conceptually and empirically. Family dynamics such as the 
rotten-kid syndrome (Bergstrom, 1989), altruism (Schulze et al., 2001) and perceived unfairness 
among siblings (Kets de Vries, 1993), all tend to spill over to the business system, creating a 
seedbed for stagnation rather than innovation (Morck and Yeung, 2004). Different risk profiles 
and goal functions among family members may also cause conflicts that negatively impact the 
business (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002). The weight of these hard realities, taken together, lead 





compared to firms transferred within the family, but that it takes time for these differences to 
materialize. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Long-term performance will be more positive for external transfers than 
for intra-family transfers. 
   
Risk Taking and Time Horizon Differences Between Intra-Family and External Ownership 
Transfers 
The  research  to  date  on  acquisitions  of  privately  held  firms  has  focused  on  the 
consequences of information asymmetries, encouraging sellers to deceive or hide information 
from acquiring firms, and sellers and buyers to develop informal relationships to counter these 
asymmetries (Graebner, 2009). A more fundamental implication of information asymmetry is 
that it introduces an element of uncertainty into the performance expectation of family firms that 
are  acquired.  Akerlof‘s    (1970)  economic  theory  of  ‗lemons‘  refers  to  a  seller‘s  knowledge 
advantage about the inherent value of a product, relative to that of the buyer. This arrangement 
appears particularly relevant to the case of the external transfer of ownership of family firms. 
Families have incentives to present their firms to potential buyers as high-quality and with large 
growth potential. Due diligence in finding out the details is inherently very difficult since much 
of the tacit knowledge related to customers, markets, and growth potential of the firms resides in 
the heads and social network of family member owners/managers (Carney, 2005; Pearson, Carr 
and Shaw, 2008;  Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). This disparity in part explains why acquiring firms 
may require the family CEO to stay in management for a period after the sale of the family firm 
(Mickelson  and  Worley,  2003).  According  to  the  ‗lemon‘  metaphor,  it  is  because  of  this 
information asymmetry that outside buyers cannot know the immediate and long-term prospects 





targets, but are aware of the risk that the chosen target company may turn out to be sour – i.e., 
there  may  well  be  unforeseen  acute  and  structural  problems  regarding  the  firm‘s  long-term 
potential that a formal due diligence procedure might fail to ascertain. According to Akerlof‘s 
theory, potential buyers will take this realistic fear into consideration by factoring uncertainty 
into the acquisition of family firms. They are aware of the potential of ‗window dressing‘ and 
will only pursue an acquisition to completion if they are comfortable to bear that uncertainty for 
the future. Buyers of family firms are likely to have relatively high tolerance for uncertainty and 
be conscious about it. Thus, although rarely discussed in the literature, acquirers of closely held 
family firms are inherently bearers of uncertainty, and thus entrepreneurial in much the same 
way as business founders (cf. Knight, 1921; Sarasvathy, 2001). 
Given this endemic uncertainty, it is useful to view buyers as acquiring an ‗option‘ for a 
business  platform  and  a  business  opportunity  that  they  think  they  can  develop  (Folta  and 
O‘Brien,  2008).  A  fundamental  property  of  uncertainty  is  that  it  leads  to  outcome  variance 
(Knight, 1921). Due to the greater role of uncertainty associated with family firms acquired by 
external owners, we expect them in their journey of ‗calculated risk‘ to exhibit greater variance 
in performance following the ownership transfer.  
We noted that prior research suggests that if a family intends to retain the business for the 
next generation, they are more likely to have a long-term view of ensuring stability and survival 
of  the  firm  (Habberson  and  Pistrui,  2002;  Lumpkin  et  al.,  2010;  Zellweger,  2007).  
Consequently, rather than seeking an optimal level of risk – both business risk and risk related to 
capital structure – they are willing to trade off optimal performance to ensure long-term survival 





shown to forego an optimal capital structure in favor of financing operations with internally 
generated funds because this is associated with lower risk exposure (Burkart et al., 2003). 
More debt, on the other hand, is associated with greater financial leverage and higher risk, 
and should therefore lead to greater variance in performance. The takeover and entry of new 
ownership and management in external ownership transfers also represents risk because of the 
extensive  changes  that  it  entails.  Therefore,  we  can  expect  that  family  businesses  where 
ownership is transferred within the family will exhibit relatively little performance variance, and 
few firms will fail in the short run. Comparing the difference in risk and uncertainty between 
intra-family and externally transferred businesses leads us to pose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Long-term performance variance post ownership transfer will be higher 
for external transfers than for intra-family transfers. 
 
The nature of risk is intimately tied to the time horizon through which managers believe 
that their investments should pay off (Bernstein, 1996). As opposed to the capital market where 
risk is framed as unexpected variability or volatility, managers seldom seek or measure risk in 
probabilistic terms, nor even reduce it to a quantifiable construct (March and Shapira, 1987). The 
time aspect of risk has been thoroughly researched in behavioral finance (Kyle, Ou-Yang and 
Xiong, 2006), yet has only recently received systematic attention in theorizing on succession 
decisions  in  family  firms.  The  time  aspect  is  important  to  the  survival  of  firms  following 
succession in three distinct ways: 
First, in family firms senior managers typically have substantial discretion. They can act 
not on the behalf of a diverse group of anonymous shareholders and their appointed board, but 





2005). While employed managers are generally most interested in firm performance during the 
period in which they are compensated (Walsh and Seward, 1990), family managers can more 
effectively focus on the long-term survival of the firm due to the long time horizon affecting both 
decisions about capital budgeting and resource-allocation.  
Second, the time aspect of risk is closely related to firms‘ capital budgeting decisions. 
Zellweger  (2007)  argues  that  while  traditional  financial  models  of  capital  budgets  model 
investment decisions as discrete ‗stand-alone‘ decisions with a fixed time horizon, in practice 
managers  in  family  firms  display  a  longer  time  horizon  for  investments  than  most  of  their 
nonfamily counterparts. This, in turn, influences the risk-equivalent costs of equity capital. If 
long-term survival is a goal that may take precedence over short-term performance – as it often is 
among family businesses (Stafford et al., 1999) – family ownership may provide an effective 
structure to manage financial capital since families generally have a longer time horizon and are 
less exposed to fluctuations in the capital markets (Dreux, 1990). John Walton of Wal-Mart 
describes his family‘s perspective of their involvement with Wal-Mart as follows (Weber and 
Lavel, 2001): ―We view [the company] really more as a trust, as a legacy we are responsible for, 
rather than something we own‖. 
Third,  the  time  aspect  of  risk  is  also  related  to  firms‘  resource  allocation  decisions.  
Business owners may have different and compelling preferences about the time frame within 
which investments need to pay-off. For instance, Sirmon and Hitt (2003) argue that family firm 
owners  are more likely to  use a longer  time horizon for resource  allocation  than nonfamily 
owners  (‗patient  capital‘).    Here,  financial  capital  is  invested  for  long  periods  without  the 
intention  of  liquidation  (Dobrzynski,  1993;  Sirmon  and  Hitt,  2003).  Time  horizons  for  the 





horizons that are either too short or too long result in less accurate estimations. Time horizons 
that  are  too  short  are  likely  to  produce  under-valuations  of  specific  resources  –  specifically 
intangible resources such as social or intellectual capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003).  On the other 
hand time horizons that are too far out can encourage the holding of resources that have less 
value  in  competitive  markets  (D‘Aveni,  1994).  In  sum,  these  three  differences  in  the  time 
horizon of family firms lead us to posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Survival post ownership transfer will be higher for intra-family transfers 
than for external transfers. 
 
METHODS 
Research Design and Sample 
Examining and contrasting the performance of firms transferred within families and those 
taken over by external owners poses multiple methodological challenges. First, we need to obtain 
robust data on both types of ownership transfers and avoid possible sample selection biases. 
Second, in order to avoid selection on the dependent variable (performance), we need a sample 
of  firms  that  can  be  followed  with  equal  frequency  of  observations  from  the  time  before 
ownership transfer and into the future.  
We confronted these potential challenges by constructing a unique longitudinal dataset, 
combining three longitudinal databases maintained by Statistics Sweden, the official bureau of 
census in Sweden. The database RAMS provides yearly data on all firms registered in Sweden, 
including measures of annual sales, profitability and debt. The database LISA provides yearly 






1 provides information on couples (if they are married or if they are living together and 
have children together) as well as biologically linked families (parents and children). 
These three  databases aggregate annual information about individuals and/or  firms, and 
thus our analyses are based on annual data. As  our basic sampling frame we chose all privately 
held firms with 10 employees or more that were in existence in Sweden  any time between 1997 
and 2007. This excludes smaller family firms that generall y would not be realistic acquisition 
targets and where succession   may be  ‗a  trivial  decision‘  (cf.  Gimeno  et  al.,  1997).  In  our 
universe  we  include  all  such  firms  that  were  operated  and  owned  by  two  or  more  family 
members  either  in  a  household  (spousal  couple)  or  in  a  biologically  linked  family  (fathers, 
mothers, and children living in the same or another household). Statistics Sweden does not report 
on exact ownership shares, but rather on the individuals or group of individuals that work in the 
business as majority owner(s). Since we focus on non-listed family firms, which are generally 
small to medium-sized in Sweden as in other developed nations, the bias of this official filter can 
be ignored for all practical purposes. In such firms ownership and management are typically 
unified,  and  the  transfer  of  management  and  ownership  typically  go  hand  in  hand  (Carney, 
2005).  This  blind  spot  about  ‗exact  ownership  shares‘  does  mean  we  cannot  investigate 
transitions of minority ownership stakes.  Our focus here, however, is on the specific point in 
time when the successor(s) actually take over majority ownership. 
We define household members as ‗nuclear family‘, children and parents living elsewhere 
as ‗immediate family‘ (Robins and Tomanec, 1962). Both categories are included our definition 
of family firms, but that of ‗extended family‘ (siblings, cousins or uncles/aunts) is not. The result 
                                                       





is a sample of 3,280 firms, where the average firm has 30.45 (s.d. 147.53) employees and annual 
sales of 43,280,320 SEK (approx. 6,200,000 USD). 
We tracked the complete life histories of these firms prior to 2007, to investigate whether 
or not they went through an ownership change. We chose to retain only those firms that went 
through an ownership transition in 1998 or later. This cut-off point is motivated by our goal to 
investigate both short-term and long-term performance levels following an ownership change. 
Further, we sought to look at performance levels preceding an ownership change in order to 
control for possible performance differences before the transfer. Given that we investigate a 
panel of firms that undergo a transfer for any of the years 1998-2007, and follow these until the 
end of 2007, we study 10 full cohorts of firms. We thus have access to data on performance and 
survival ranging from 1 and 10 years subsequent to a particular succession. This allows us to 
account for right censoring and control for macroeconomic fluctuation since our study extends 
beyond a specific business cycle. 
The data used in this study is from Sweden, one of the few countries where this kind of 
population data is available. While being able to study a whole population of firms certainly is an 
invaluable strength, we also recognize that features of our research may be context-specific, an 
issue about which there is growing consciousness in entrepreneurship research (Zahra, 2007; 
Welter,  2010).  Indeed,  the  meaning  of  short-term  and  long-term  performance  may  differ 
between countries, and so can the definition of a family. For instance, in a Swedish family 
business context it makes sense to focus on the nuclear and immediate family (intra-household 
family and extra-household parents and children) since extended kinship relations in economic 
and social life are generally low (Popenoe, 1987).  Below in the discussion section we return to 





Short-term  vs.  long-term  orientation.  While  we  have  found  no  theory  that  explicitly 
relates strategic decisions to short-term vs. long-term orientation of managers and teams (Van 
der  Stede,  2000),  Lumpkin  et  al.  (2010)  do  provide  a  conceptual  definition  of  long-term 
orientation as the tendency to prioritize the long range implications and impact of decisions and 
actions that come to fruition after an extended time period. We base our empirical approximation 
of Lumpkin et al.‘s definition and the research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A:s) in strategic 
management which suggests that a time period of 3-4  years is necessary in order to realize 
critical  outcomes  of  M&A:s  (Capron,  1999).  Hence,  in  our  paper,  we  define  short-term 
performance as performance up to 3 years after a succession, and long-term performance as 
performance more than 3 years after a succession. 
 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent Variable: Performance. In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we 
rely on two separate indicators of performance taken from secondary sources containing annual 
statements. In Sweden all incorporated firms have to report full annual statements underwritten 
by a chartered accountant. Earnings before interest and tax (EBITA) is the profit of the firm as 
reported to the tax authorities. It can be utilized as  a continuous variable, measuring  on a yearly 
basis  profits  after  financial  income  and  expenses.  The  other  performance  indicator  is  Sales 
Growth. Here again we rely on secondary sources containing annual statements and registering 
total net sales of the firm as reported to the tax authorities. Growth refers to changing size over 
time  (Shepherd  and  Wiklund,  2009).  Consistent  with  our  analytical  approach  focusing  on 
difference-in-difference estimation (see below), we compared post-transfer sales to pre-transfer 





or after a transfer. The alternative of merely comparing differences in growth rates is precluded 
as illegitimate by virtue of our analytical approach. Because the distribution of growth in sales is 
skewed, we rely on the natural log of sales growth in the test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Dependent Variable: Performance Variance. To estimate performance variance for each 
of the performance indicators, we looked carefully at how performance varied over the period 
following the ownership transfer. Since our focus is on long-term performance variance, we 
investigate performance variance up to three years after the succession.
2 
Dependent Variable: Survival. We have had access to detailed information about the 
firms and the extent to which they continue to do business. Disappearance from a data register 
was not considered in itself a sufficient criterion for assuming if a firm had failed to survive. In 
Sweden any legal change in an incorporated firm has to be reported to the authorities, and this 
information is passed on to Statistics Sweden. Consequently our dataset contained a rich amount 
of information about all kinds of firm exits, including discontinuance, merger, and acquisition. It 
should be stressed that exit by merger or acquisition need not be a sign of organizational failure. 
To the contrary, divesting their equity can instead be seen as the pinnacle of success for many 
firm owner-managers. We therefore believe that discontinued and acquired/merged firms should 
not be pooled in our survival analysis and excluded them.  
Independent  Variable.  Ownership  Transfer.  Ownership  transfer  (succession)  can  take 
place either within the family or outside the family (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2001; 
Wennberg  et  al.,  2010).  If  one  or  several  individuals  of  the  nuclear  or  immediate  family 
(spouse(s),  and/or  child(ren))  exits  ownership/management  from  one  year  to  another,  and 
someone else in that nuclear or immediate family either remains as owner/manager or enters 
                                                       
2 In the results section we also report on a number of robustness checks, including a model investigating 





ownership/management, we consider this an intra-family ownership succession (cf. Bjuggren and 
Sund, 2002; De Massis et al., 2008). If all owner/managers of a family firm exit ownership and 
management  from  one  year  to  the  next,  and  new  owner/manager(s)  outside  the  nuclear  and 
immediate family enter during the same time period, we consider this an external ownership 
transition.
3  To  avoid  arbitrarily  classifying  firms  sh ifted  within  the  extended  family 
(grandchildren and/or siblings living elsewhere) as external transfers – which may be considered 
a ‗sub category‘ of internal successions
4 – we deliberately exclude such firms from the sample. 
Our family firm definition is in line with classic definitions since we view family firms as those 
where  ownership  rests  in  the  hands  of  a  single  nuclear  family  (Bernard,  1975;  Barnes  and 
Hershon, 1976) and their children living in the household or elsewhere (Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma, 1999). With these definitions, approximately 35% of ownership transitions occur within 
the family while 65% are transitions to outsiders.  This variable is coded 1 if the ownership 
transfer is intra-family and 0 if it is external. 
Control Variables: We also include a number of control variables. The exact control 
variables used in each model are shown in the relevant table. To control for possible  ‗window-
dressing‘ of firms prior to transfer, and for differences in a firms‘ leverage and therefore risk 
profile (as opposed to owners‘ perception of firms‘ risk taking), we control for Pre-transfer debt 
ratio by measuring debts over owners‘ equity in the year preceding a transfer. To control for 
macroeconomic and environmental conditions that may alter family businesses‘ preferences for 
intra-family or external transfer of ownership –– independent of either the quality of managers in 
the next generation or the business risk of the firm, we include year dummies as well as a time-
                                                       
3 Since we focus on individuals or families that can be identified as majority owners, our definition exclude external 
transfers via strategic sales to corporate acquirers. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 





varying measure of sum of venture capital investments in Sweden (the best proxy available for 
the availability of external investments). This variable was taken from Isaksson (2006). We also 
control for Transition year, by including a series of dummy variables, coded 1 for the year the 
ownership transit took place and 0 for all other years. Finally, we control for Firm size, measured 
as number of employees. We also use Sales, measured as total net sales of the firm as reported to 
the tax authorities, as a control in the survival model.  
 
Analytical Approach 
The  primary  goal  of  this  study  is  to  compare  how  short  and  long-term  performance 
develops in family firms that are sold to outsiders compared to firms that go through intra-family 
ownership transfer. Given that we are interested in two different groups,  and how performance 
is  influenced  (changes)  as  a  consequence  of  ownership  changes  that  these  two  groups  go 
through,  difference-in-difference  estimation  (DD)  techniques  employed  in  similar  studies 
(Bennedsen et al., 2007) appears ideal for our purposes. The DD estimator represents the within-
subject performance difference during, before and after the ownership transfer of the two groups, 
intra-family transfers and external transfers. This estimation adjusts for biases that are due to 
permanent  differences  between  the  groups.  In  other  words,  DD  adjusts  for  differences  that 
existed before the transition took place. This procedure is used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The 
DD estimation is obtained by:  
 






where  y is the outcome of interest, i.e., performance. Post is a dummy variable stating if 
the time period is before (0) or after (1) the succession. Ownershiptransition is a dummy variable 
stating if the firm belongs to the treatment group (i.e., intra-family succession) or to the control 
group (external succession).     is a vector of control variables. The coefficient of interest, δ1, 
represents the interaction term of post and ownershiptransition and is equal to one for intra-
family transfers. The coefficient shows the difference pertaining to the family succession. In 
short, the difference-in-difference estimate for the two groups and the pre and post succession 
period can be expressed as: 
 
                                             
 
In  order  to  test  for  systematic  differences  between  the  two  groups  before  and  after 
succession, while simultaneously controlling for other factors that may change exogenously after 
succession,  we  include  a  set  of  control  variables,  listed  in  the  note  below  Table  2.  OLS 
regression is used for examining Hypothesis 3. It is expressed as: 
                         
 
where y is the performance variance computed for each firm separately; it constitutes the 
variance in performance measured as sales growth and EBITA. Since Figure 1 indicates that the 
mean levels of performance are highly variable over the years of interest, the model is estimated 
for each firm as its mean variance over the first five years following the ownership transfer.
5  
                                                       
5 Because we only include firms that were in existence for five years following the ownership transfer, we are unable 
to include all cohorts. Further, some firms exit and do not provide complete data over the five years following the 
transition. Therefore, the number of observations in Table 3 (1,330) is lower than the survival model in table 4 





The independent variable is the type of ownership transition, expressed as the dummy 
variable intra-family transfer. In addition, a vector of control variables (Pre-transfer debt ratio, 
Pre-transfer firm size in number of employees, Pre-transfer sales and sum VC investments are 
included). Sales and Employees are both important measures of firm growth, but not necessarily 
in the same direction; thus one should be controlled for when estimating the other (Shepherd and 
Wiklund, 2009).  Consequently both are used as controls. In this context Sales and Employees 
were found to be quite highly correlated (0.89), a pattern which may inflate the standard errors 
and introduce biased estimates. To guard against the possible multicollinearity we conducted two 
key robustness checks. First, computed VIF values were found to not exceed 4.24, far below the 
generally critical value of 9. Second, in unreported models (available upon request) we estimated 
identical  models  for  variance  in  sales  and  EBITA  without  employees,  as  well  as  models 
excluding the largest  5% and smallest  5% of  firms  (in terms  of  employees). None  of these 
models changed the significance level or direction of the results in Table 3, indicating our results 
are robust against the potential for multicollinearity. 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we rely on survival data and a Cox proportional hazard 
model  to  estimate  the  hazard  of  firm  exit.  The  survival  model  utilizes  information  about 
observations of firms that experience an exit along with those that do not, thus correcting for 
right-censoring. A correlation matrix is available in Appendix 1.  
    
RESULTS 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 as pooled OLS for all years regardless of time from succession. The results were qualitatively similar but results 
sensitive to outliers (as shown in Figure 1, variance in performance is high for the first few years after succession). 
Second, we estimated two-stage Heckman models where debt ratio and sum of VC investments were used in the 
first-stage selection equation. The results of the Heckman model for variance in Sales growth were identical, but for 
EBITA variance failed to converge due to some skewed variables, a not uncommon problem since the Heckman 
model is sensitive to skewed variables (Little and Rubin, 1987). These tests indicate that our results are sound and 





Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the different performance measures both the year 
prior to the succession (t1) and in the five years following the succession (t+1 to t+5). It can be 
noted in the table that prior to succession, firms which experience intra-family transfers are, on 
average, larger in employment size and report higher profits in terms of EBITA.  
 
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
____________________ 
 
In Table 2 we report the results obtained in the DD estimation, which corresponds to the testing 
of  Hypotheses  1  and  2.  The  estimation  controls  for  systematics  difference  between  the  two 
groups, and thus adjusts for biases that are due to permanent differences between them. In order 
to control for environmental differences that may occur subsequent to transition, the estimation 
has been accomplished both without control variables and with the control variables listed in the 
note below Table 2. Both models produced similar results. As explained in the methodology 
section, the interaction term δ1 in the DD estimator takes the value one for intra-family transfers. 
Hence a positive coefficient in Table 2 indicates higher performance differences for intra-family 
transfers, whereas a negative coefficient indicates higher performance differences  for external 
transfers. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that the short-term performance will be more positive for intra-
family transfers than for external transfers.  Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, proposes that long-
term performance will be more positive for external transfers than for intra-family transfers. 





very short term, while firms transferred to outsiders will perform better in the long run, with a 
shift somewhere in the mid-term of 3-4 years (Capron, 1999; Lumpkin et al. 2010). 
____________________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
____________________ 
 
When comparing the performance, measured as EBITA and sales, of intra-family and 
external transfers of ownership in Table 2, we obtain the following results for each of the 5 
years subsequent to the transfer.  The coefficient for EBITA is negative every year except for 
year two
6, implying that firms transferred to outsiders outperform intra-family transfers in each 
of the years following ownership transition. The results are -1037.80 (p > 0.10); -104.29 (p > 
0.10);  -518.34  (p > 0.10);  -1665.56  (p < 0.05); and  -1308.46  (p < 0.05). As noted, the 
performance difference between the two groups is statistically significant only subsequent to 
year 3. The coefficient for sales is negative for each year, suggesting that firms transferred 
externally have consistently higher sales growth compared to intra-family transfers. The results 
are -1.05 (p < 0.01); -1.20 (p < 0.01); -1.30 (p < 0.01); -1.38 (p < 0.01); and -1.87 (p < 0.01). 
Thus, in terms of sales growth external transfers outperform intra -family transfers in each and 
every of the years studied. The results run directly counter to Hypothesis 1 which stated that the 
short-term performance  would  be more positive for intra -family transfers than for external 
transfers, and it is rejected. However, the evidence clearly indicates the long-term performance 
advantage of external transfers for both performance indicators (for sales growth during all of 
the years post succession and for EBITA in years 4 and 5). This fully supports Hypothesis 2. 
                                                       





To better illustrate the magnitude of the differences in performance development for the 
two  groups  we  also  include  two  graphs  in  Figure  1  displaying  their  mean  performance 
differences following ownership transfer. Two things are particularly noteworthy. First, there 
seems to be a ‗window dressing‘ effect for firms that are transferred externally, noticeable for 
both sales growth and EBITA. Both performance indicators are higher for the first year and then 
drop off, only to recover in years 4 and 5. Given that we rely on several cohorts followed over 
multiple  years,  this  result  is  obviously  not  driven  by  specific  external  factors  such  as  the 
availability of venture capital or even the otherwise all-important economic cycle. The second 
noteworthy feature of the graphs is that the performance advantage of the externally transferred 
firms seems to increase over time, as indicated by the larger gap between the two graphs. This 
provides further support for Hypothesis 2 that external ownership transfers have positive long-
term effects.  
 
____________________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
____________________ 
 
According to Hypothesis 3 we expect that the performance variance post ownership 
transfer to be higher for firms transferred to outsiders than for those transferred within the 
family.  Table  3  reports  results  from  a  pooled  cross-sectional  OLS,  controlling  for  year  of 






Insert Table 3 here 
____________________ 
 
The dependent variable is obtained for all firms that survive at least five years. The 
results show that firms transferred externally have higher variance in sales growth over time (0. 
464, p < 0.001).  In addition, the results for EBITA confirm that firms transferred to outsiders 
have higher variance (-0.371, p < 0.05). In sum, these tests provide full support for Hypothesis 
3.  
Hypothesis 4 follows the same logic that led us to expect higher variance in performance 
for firms transferred externally, anticipating that survival post ownership transfer will be higher 
for firms transferred within the family than those transferred externally. The difference between 
the two ownership transfer types is illustrated in a graphical presentation of the Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimates, Figure 2.  It is clear that the survival curve for externally transferred firms 
lies below that of the firms that are internally transferred. Since the former are on average 
smaller,  it  is  critical  not  to  accept  Figure  2  as  evidence  supporting  hypothesis  4  before 
conducting a multivariate test. Table 4 presents this test in the form of a proportional hazard 
model (Cox regression). As noted, the effect of the control variable firm size is not statistically 
significant, although the other firm-level variables debt-ratio and sales and the environmental-
level control for sum VC investments all appear to marginally impact a firms‘ likelihood of 
survival. However, the coefficient for Intra-family transfer exhibits by far the strongest effect 
on probability of survival. The hazard rate coefficient of 0.443 (p < 0.001) indicates the risk of 
firm failure is reduced by approximately 56% for firms that are transferred within the family. 










In  this  paper,  we  have  concentrated  on  ownership  transfers  of  family  businesses, 
comparing the short-term and long-term performance implications of intra-family transfers in 
contrast  to  transfer  of  ownership  to  outsiders.  Our  unique  research  design  allowed  us  to 
conceptually and empirically separate each  class  of business  transition and to  examine their 
associated performance outcomes. Research on the implications of different succession routes 
has  been  deemed  important  among  family  business  scholars  (Bjuggren  and  Sund,  2002; 
LeBreton-Miller et al., 2004; DeMassis et al., 2008) because succession represents one of the 
most important events in the development of family businesses, and passing the business on to 
outsiders marks a radical shift in the fate of a family business (Sharma, 2004). While we believe 
that it fruitful to examine the implications of many different kinds of ownership transfers, the 
most  essential  relates  to  the  dilemma  between  keeping  the  business  within  the  family  or  to 
selling it to an external party. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents a first attempt 
to  separate  these  two  aspects  of  ownership  transfers,  and  to  examine  their  associated 
performance outcomes both in the short and the long run. This was made possible, in part, thanks 
to our unique research design.  
Based on theory related to the long-term orientation of family business, we argued family 
firms managed with the intention of being transferred intra-family have more of a long-term 





hypotheses  concerning  the  performance  implications  of  these  ownership  transitions,  three  of 
which were supported by our empirical analyses. We anticipated but did not find support for the 
idea that owner families ‗window dressed‘ the firms that were sold externally so that initially, 
firms transferred externally would exhibit lower performance. Perhaps this is because acquirers 
buy the firm because they have spotted the possibility to improve performance (cf. Wright et al, 
2001) and this counteract any effects of window dressing.  
One of the novel contributions of this study research is that it adds to our understanding of 
the meaning and implications of long-term orientation in family firms (James, 1999; Miller and 
LeBreton-Miller,  2005;  Lumpkin  et  al.,  2010).  More  specifically,  we  conceptually  and 
empirically separate the short-term performance effects that can be attributed to the difference 
between the nature of the firms that are offered to external buyers and the ones transferred within 
the  family,  from  the  long-term  performance  effects  that  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in 
management.  The  latter,  we  argue,  is  associated  with  values,  preferences,  and  managerial 
capability.  
Assuming that families are rational decision makers when it comes to choosing which 
firms  they offer to  outside buyers and  which firms to  retain within the family, we built  on 
Akerlof‘s  (1970)  ideas  of  information  asymmetry  and  uncertainty  to  hypothesize  that  firms 
managed for the long run would be transferred internally, whereas firms with more uncertain 
prospects would be offered for sale to the highest bidder. Also, the external buyers of the firms 
sold by the family would have a higher preference for risk. We have found substantial support 
for these ideas. In general, survival seems to be lower for firms transferred externally and their 
performance  is  also  more  variable.  These  findings  have  some  interesting  implications. 





transfer of ownership. Long-term survival is an important goal for family businesses (Zellweger, 
2007). Our study is no doubt one of the first to closely examine the survival issue of firms that go 
through family succession, using a highly relevant comparison group, i.e., the survival of firms 
transferred to owners. On the basis of this finding, it appears families generally are capable of 
managing their firms for long-term survival.  
We  hypothesized  and  found  strong  support  for  the  claim  that  in  the  long  run  firms 
transferred to external owners would outperform firms transferred internally in the family. We 
believe our approach offers helpful substantive and methodological insights to the current debate 
on the impact of family vs. non-family succession for a firm‘s performance and entrepreneurial 
development (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 
2008).  While to date most studies have focused on performance differences only at a specific 
point in time, we investigated performance effects of firm successions using multiple points of 
measurement  over  an  extended  period  of  time.  The  new  terrain  we  have  opened  cannot  be 
ignored, as we found clear differential results depending on the time horizon used for measuring 
performance.  
We  noted  that  acquirers  of  closely  held  family  businesses  are  bearers  of  uncertainty 
because of the information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, and that such individuals are 
likely risk tolerant. It appears that as bearers of uncertainty they are entrepreneurial, in many 
ways similar to business founders (Knight, 1921; Sarasvathy, 2001). The acquisition of existing 
businesses  as  a  route  to  entrepreneurship  is  a  topic  that  generally  has  been  unfortunately 
overlooked in the prior literature (Nordqvist and Melin, 2010; Parker and Van Praag, 2011). 





performance of firms transferred to owners within the family, it appears that it should be a topic 
of central importance to scholars interested in strategic entrepreneurship. 
We found in studying performance over multiple time periods that many owner-families 
seem to struggle to secure long term performance in the companies they keep in the family. We 
suggest three main reasons why this struggle is difficult to overcome. First, families tend to have 
a long-term orientation, leading them to prioritize a capital structure that allows them to retain 
the control  rights  over the business  over other  more optimal capital  structures.  Due to  their 
reluctance to take on debt, they may forego attractive investment opportunities. Businesses that 
are transferred to external parties do not have such restrictions, which can explain the long-term 
performance  differences  that  we  observed.  Second,  in  their  search  for  suitable  owners  and 
managers from the next generation of the family, families draw on a limited pool of managerial 
capabilities. While we concur with those that observe that family membership can lead to the 
acquisition of unique tacit knowledge about the family and the family business (Carney, 2005; 
Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), it seems external owners at least over the long term are better equipped 
to extend the value of these businesses. Finally, the fact that family businesses prioritize non-
financial goals could be detrimental to long-term performance. For example, goals that benefit 
the family may not always be in the best interest of the business, causing some families to retain 
resources for their own private use and deprive the business of what it needs to grow and prosper 
(Morck and Yeung, 2004).   
Our research also provides informed guidance for family business and entrepreneurship 
research about the proper units of analysis when measuring performance. For a family transfer 
within the family represents a commitment to continued family ownership, whereas external sale 





2010; DeTienne, 2010). We found that firms exhibited systematically higher performance when 
transferred externally, but that firms transferred internally had markedly higher survival rates. 
This indicates that what is better for family wealth may not be better for the firm. On the firm 
level, external transfers exhibit higher performance (but lower survival); while on the family 
level internal transfers may represent prolonged entrepreneurship for the family. We believe that 
this is an interesting finding, reinforcing the need to be clear about both the level of analysis 
utilized and exactly what performance measure represents entrepreneurship at the specified level 
(Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001).  
Finally, our research contributes to the expanding literature on entrepreneurial exit by 
linking  it  to  the  research  on  family  business  succession,  and  by  studying  the  performance 
implications of family business exits. Scholars have observed that there are multiple exit paths 
that  entrepreneurs  can  choose  among  (Wennberg  et  al.,  2010).  Our  study  provides  the  best 
estimate to date of the relative frequency of intra-family and external ownership transfers of 
family firms. We found that nearly two-thirds of all recent ownership transfers in Sweden were 
external, providing ample evidence the sale of family businesses is a frequent phenomenon. We 
also show that to a large extent that the firms that let go of the controlling family tend to benefit, 
at least in terms of better performance. 
Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  our  study  shows  there  are  many  research  opportunities  for 
entrepreneurship  scholars  to  learn  more  about  exits  if  they  focus  more  on  family  business 
succession. On the other hand, our study shows that there are many reasons why family business 
researchers should devote more attention to the sale of family businesses to new outside owners, 





To the extent that exit has been studied in the family business literature to date it has been 
conceptual or exploratory, looking at the internal challenges and difficulties regarding selling to 
outsiders, such as inertia and family members‘ emotional attachment to businesses and units 
(Salvato,  Chirico  and  Sharma.  2010;  Sharma  and  Manikutty,  2005).  We  contribute  to  this 
literature not only by providing solid empirical evidence of the phenomenon and of the relative 
performance implications of different sale and exit routes, but also by providing theoretically 
sound explanations of  the performance outcomes of these choices.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study also comes with limitations, several of which represent interesting avenues for 
future research. While we believe the distinction between intra-family and external ownership 
transfer is essential for understanding succession in family business, we are cognizant of the fact  
that neither intra-family nor external ownership transfers are homogeneous. For example, it is 
well-known there are basic differences between second and third generation successions, and 
that the impact of different types of acquirers may vary (such as between MBOs and MBIs). 
Nevertheless, this paper represents a first attempt to systematically examine the performance 
implications  of  external  and  intra-family  ownership  transitions.  We  believe  focusing  on  this 
fundamental difference is a necessary first step which future more fine-grained analyses of the 
performance implications of different types of intra-family and external ownership transfers will 
elaborate and modify. Given that we detected differential impact of intra-family and external 
ownership  transfers  on  post  succession  performance,  and  the  fact  that  quantitative  studies 





studies  of  how  various  succession  routes  affect  firm  performance  in  the  short  and  long  run 
remains an important topic. 
An  important  limitation  of  our  study  is  that  we  were  unable  to  distinguish  between 
different  kinds  of  acquirers.  Specifically,  we  were  unable  to  look  at  second-generation 
successions as a distinct type of intra-family transfer, or management buy-outs or buy-ins as 
distinct types of external transfers (Howorth, Westhead and Wright, 2004; Scholes et al, 2007). 
Future research should explore potentially very strong differences between first-generation and 
second-generation successions. Further, it would also be of interest to find out if performance 
differences depend on whether the acquirer is an individual formerly employed in the firm, a 
private  equity  firm,  a  competitor  in  the  same  industry,  and  so  forth.  The  performance 
implications of these different types of new owners may well show a pattern, playing a vital role 
in the dynamics of how the fortunes of firms play out over the years.  In our working model, 
these  cases  represent  nothing  less  than  the  potential  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  within  the 
group of external ownership transfers. Since the results indicated clear differences by which 
intra-family and external successions shaped the subsequent performance and survival for firms, 
such unobserved heterogeneity is an unlikely reason for spurious results, but rather decreases the 
explanatory power of our models. It is almost certain that with even more detailed information 
on types of ownership transfers, we would actually have seen stronger performance implications, 
and more fine-grained nuances depending on the type of external successor. Future studies would 
benefit from access to such information. 
The central argument made here is that given the long term orientation of family firms, 
there are differences between short-term and long-term performance of family firms that are 





inquiry relied on a unique database to follow family firms before, during and after an ownership 
change, so as (a) to establish a base of comparison between similar firms transferred internally or 
externally,  and  (b)  to  be  able  to  observe  such  temporal  differences  in  their  subsequent 
development. This is something prior research, relying on samples of a more cross-sectional 
nature,  has  not  been  able  to  investigate.  However,  we  were  unable  to  investigate  in  full 
performance beyond five years after a transfer. While our findings indicate ownership changes in 
family firms may represent a new stage of ‗firm liability‘ that needs to be bridged by new owners 
(Carroll, 1984), these are ideas that may be challenged or extended by looking at an even longer 
post-succession time period. Questions about which factors contribute to such liabilities and how 
family heirs and new owners deal with them represent intriguing avenues for further research.  
Another potential limitation is our stringent definition of family firms and succession. We 
restricted our concept of family firms and family succession to include only the nuclear and 
immediate next generation family members.  We thus excluded firms owned by e.g., a person 
and his/her uncle/aunt, and ownership transfers to e.g., cousins. Although these definitions of 
fundamental types follow from our goal and ensure construct validity in the context we study 
(Popenoe, 1987), it is certainly the case that more inclusive definitions of these categories would 
have  led  to  expanded  and  possibly  different  results.  The  notion  of  family  in  the  traditional 
Swedish context typically refers to the nuclear and immediate family members (Bjuggren and 
Sund, 2002). Cousins, uncles and aunts and other members tend be seen as extended family, 
relatives with whom relations are typically weaker.  
A strength of our research is that we were fortunate enough to have been able to test the 
hypotheses by using as a base the entire population of firms and individuals in a single country. 





with a relatively small population.  Although Sweden in terms of family business succession 
exhibits  many  similarities  to  other  Western  European  countries,  there  are  also  differences. 
Specifically, our definition of family firms as focusing on the nuclear and immediate family 
(intra-household  family  and  extra-household  parents  and  sibling)  might  be  less  relevant  in 
nations and regions where kinship relations across distant family members are stronger or more 
common – such as Spain, Italy; Latin America or Southeast Asia. Hence we encourage scholars, 
practitioners and policymakers alike to be careful in generalizing and applying our findings to 
other countries without taking the context specificity of those countries in account. At the same 
time,  we  contend  that  cross-country  comparisons  with  regard  to  ownership  transfer  and 
performance represent a fruitful avenue for future research. Our paper contributes to strategic 
entrepreneurship and family business research by highlighting the difference in types of firms‘ 
transfers externally or within the family. Our findings that performance results differ depending 
on the time horizon used explain some of the discrepancies in earlier studies, highlighting the 
importance  of  further  research  on  the  implications  of  long-term  orientation  among  family 
businesses. 
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External transfers           Year                   
   t-1  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
EBITA  2097  9504  3027  15117  2084  11665  2275  12907  3398  20352  3417  21925 
Sales  43847  80394  53035  97118  46937  94982  47923  105022  54600  135060  62719  189305 
Sales(log)  10,11  0,97  10,18  1,1  10,04  1,37  10,07  1,32  10,18  1,29  10,16  1,38 
Intra-family transfers           Year                   
   t-1  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
EBITA  1894  18507  1742  5463  2161  9848  1985  6252  1665  5465  1897  7655 
Sales  40455  175098  40637  87637  41640  88552  43751  92207  48002  134433  49992  133879 











D-in-D Estimator (SE) 
  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5 
EBITA  -1037.80  104.29  -518.34  -1665.56* -1308.46* 
  (699.74)  (692.59)  (589.26)  (713.37)  (603.52) 
(ln)Sales  growth  -1.05*** -1.20*** -1.30***  -1.83***  -1.87*** 
  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
 
Note: Control variables for year of transition and yearly sum of VC investments post 
transition included. Positive coefficients indicate higher performance of intra-family 
transfers and negative coefficients indicate higher performance of external transfers. 
 
 
Table 3 OLS estimates for long-term variance in performance 
 






Independent variable   
Intra-family transfer 
 
-0.372**  -0.464*** 
(0.118)  (0.132) 
Control variables     
Pre-transfer debt 
ratio 
-0.001*  -0.001 
(0.000)  (0.355) 
Pre-transfer firm size 
(employees) 
0.002  -0.002 
(0.003)  (0.004) 
Pre-transfer sales  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sum VC investments  0.001  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
     
R²  0.222  0.240 
BIC Value:  -239.548  -271.833 
No. of observations:                            1,330   
 
Note: Control variables for year of transition, and year dummies included but 
unreported. Huber-white standard errors in parenthesis.  





Table 4 Cox regression predicting firm survival 
  Firm exit 
  Hazard rate  SE 
Independent variable   
Transfer within the 
family 
0.681**  (0.080) 
   
Control variables     
Pre-transfer debt 
ratio  1.000***  (0.000) 
Pre-transfer firm 
size  0.986***  (0.004) 
Pre-transfer sales  1.000**  (1.00e-06) 
VC investments  1.001  (0.004) 
     
LR  54.21   
Chi2  0.000   
Number of subjects                   3,280 




Note: Control variables for year of transition, and year dummies included but 


















Figure 1: Growth in EBITA (top) and growth sales (bottom) for intra-family transfers and 
external transfers 
 
 Graph 1. Growth in EBITA 
 
Graph 2. Growth in sales 























 Appendix 1: Correlation Matrix 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  11  12  13  14 
1. Intra-family Transfer   1.00 
                          2. Pre-transfer debt ratio  -0.03  1.00 
                        3. Pre-transfer firm size  0.01  -0.01  1.00 
                      4. Pre-transfer sales  -0.01  -0.03  0.89***  1.00 
                    5. Sum VC investments  -0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.01  1.00 
                  6. Transition year 1998  -0.03  0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.73*** 1.00 
                7. Transition year 1999  0.02  0.04  0.00  -0.01  -0.32*** -0.07*** 1.00 
              8. Transition year 2000  -0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.44***  -0.06*** -0.07**  1.00 
            9. Transition year 2001  -0.05  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.33**  -0.07**  -0.07**  -0.06**  1.00 
          10. Transition year 2002  -0.05  0.05  -0.01  -0.02  0.28**  -0.07**  -0.07**  -0.06**  -0.07**  1.00 
        11. Transition year 2003  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.18**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.07**  1.00 
      12 Transition year 2004  0.20**  0.02  -0.03  -0.05  -0.14**  -0.17**  -0.18**  -0.16**  -0.18**  -0.17**  -0.19**  1.00 
    13. Transition year 2005  -0.03  -0.03  0.00  0.01  -0.03  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.09**  -0.20**  1.00 
  14. Transition year 2006  -0.09**  -0.07**  0.00  0.03  0.02  -0.10**  -0.11**  -0.10**  -0.11**  -0.10**  -0.12**  -0.27**  -0.12**  1.00 
15. Transition year 2007  -0.08**  -0.04  0.06**  0.07**  0.06**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.07**  -0.08**  -0.20**  -0.09**  -0.12 